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Abstract. It is a widespread belief that the Kochen-Specker theorem imposes a con-
textuality constraint on the ontology of beables in quantum hidden variables theo-
ries. On the other hand, after Bell’s influential critique, the importance of von Neu-
mann’s wrongly called ‘impossibility proof’ has been severely questioned. However, 
Max Jammer, Jeffrey Bub and Dennis Dieks have proposed insightful reassessments 
of von Neumann’s theorem: what it really shows is that hidden variable theories 
cannot represent their beables by means of Hermitian operators in Hilbert space. 
Hereby I show that i) the very same constraint can be derived from Gleason’s theo-
rem, and that ii) if we consider the import of von Neumann’s and Gleason’s theo-
rems, the relevance of the Kochen-Specker theorem for hidden variables theories 
gets substantially weakened: it does not force them to be contextual in any interest-




Since the very formulation of quantum mechanics in the early decades of the 20th century, physi-
cists and philosophers got involved in discussions about what is the description of the physical 
world that the theory offers. According to the Copenhagen interpretation, which became dominant 
by the 1930s, the descriptive content of quantum mechanics reaches only observed reality, whereas 
a postulated objective reality independent of measurements is simply beyond its grasp, or even be-
yond scientific meaningfulness. Some notable figures like Einstein, de Broglie and Schrödinger, re-
sisted this view and defended that there is indeed an objective quantum reality, and that the theory 
does not capture it because it is not the whole story. This line of resistance to the Copenhagen inter-
pretation constitutes the basis for the ‘hidden variables program’. The basic idea in this program is 
that if suitable extra variables are added to the mathematical machinery of quantum mechanics, the 
theory would be able to describe the physical world independently of observation and measure-
ment. That is, the hidden variables would come to supply the description of features of physical 
systems that the quantum formalism misses.2 
1 European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11, 41 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00347-8). Please refer to the pub-
lished version for citation purposes. 
2 The attitude that the great dissidents took towards hidden variables is a complex issue. Einstein was critical of 
Bohm’s (1952) theory (see Myrvold 2003). Furthermore, in 1927 he sketched a hidden variables theory, but he did 
not publish the manuscript and abandoned the project—his discontent seems to have been non-locality (see 
Belousek 1996; Holland 2005). De Broglie formulated a hidden variables theory in 1927 (very similar to Bohm’s), but 
he soon abandoned it after criticisms he received during the Fifth Solvay Conference. However, he reconverted to 
the hidden variables view after Bohm’s (1952) work (see Bacciagaluppi & Valentini 2009). Schrödinger defended the 
incompleteness view, but he pointed out formal constraints on viable hidden variables theories that prefigure von 
Neumann’s theorem. He took these constraints as serious obstacles, but his precise attitude towards the program is 
not entirely clear (see Bacciagaluppi & Crull 2009). 
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Two formal results played important roles in the historical development and evaluation of the 
program. The first one, introduced by John von Neumann (1955) in 1932, was taken as a plain proof 
of the impossibility of a completion of quantum mechanics with hidden variables, or at least as a 
strong advice against the development of the project.  Historical accounts disagree about the extent 
and nature of vNT’s impact, but it certainly contributed to at least discourage the interest in hidden 
variables theories (HVTs).3 
Three decades later, John Bell (1966) strongly criticized von Neumann’s result: he showed that it 
is not an impossibility proof, and he further argued that the theorem is rather trivial: according to 
Bell, it only rules out an uninteresting and irrelevant class of HVTs. In 1935, Grete Hermann (2016) 
had presented a somewhat similar argument, but it did not have much impact in the community. 
The core of Bell’s and Hermann’s criticism is that a premise assumed by von Neumann cannot be 
justified for physically plausible HVTs. Unlike Hermann’s, Bell’s negative assessment of vNT be-
came very influential, and, to this day, it constitutes a common opinion in the philosophy and foun-
dations community. 
In the same paper, Bell (1966) obtained another formal result, and Simon Kochen and Ernst 
Specker (1967) independently proved the same statement one year later. The Kochen-Specker theo-
rem (KST)4 is generally understood as imposing some kind of contextuality constraint on the ontol-
ogy of physical quantities (properties, beables)5 in HVTs. That is, this theorem is typically inter-
preted as establishing that the ontology of beables portrayed by these theories must be such that, for 
some properties, either the possessed values or their very empirical effectiveness must depend on 
the context of measurement.  
Considering the basic spirit and goals of HVTs, this is a substantial compromise. If true, ontolog-
ical contextuality involves a significant concession to Copenhagen style quantum mechanics, insofar 
as measurement-independent values for contextual properties become impossible. Furthermore, 
since the assumption that Hermann and Bell criticize in vNT plays no role in the KST, the general 
opinion in the philosophy and foundations community is that the latter is a much more important 
result than the former for HVTs (see, for example, Held 2018). 
In this article, I contest the prevailing interpretation of both theorems. Despite general disdain, 
vNT does teach us something fundamental about the nature of HVTs. Jeffrey Bub (2010, 2011) has 
shown that what the theorem really states is that the beables in these theories cannot be represented 
by Hermitian operators. Max Jammer (1974) proposed an analysis of vNT that prefigures Bub’s, and 
Dennis Dieks (2017) defends a reading of the theorem along Bub’s line. Here I will show that the 
3 Some accounts state that vNT was understood as a crucial factor for a disdainful attitude towards hidden variables 
in general, and towards Bohm’s theory (1952) in particular—see, for example, Cushing (1994) and Whitaker (1996). 
This view has been contested—see, for example, Dieks (2017) and Myrvold (2003). I remain neutral about this his-
torical-sociological controversy. What is at stake here is the precise conceptual import of vNT. 
4 The right name would be “Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem”. However, the most common tag in the literature is 
“Kochen-Specker theorem”. This label is unfair, but at least it prevents confusion with Bell’s inequalities theorem. 
For simplicity, I will stick to the usual name. 
5 I will use the term “observable” in a literal way, that is, as referring to some quantity observed in a measurement, 
independently of the ontological status of what is measured. That is, remaining agnostic as to whether the measured 
quantity belongs to the measured system or to the system-and-apparatus, as to whether the quantity has objective 
reality independently of measurements or not, etc. I reserve the term “beable” for the usual notion of property pos-
sessed by a physical system, independently of measurements. 
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very same lesson can be extracted from an unquestioned and celebrated theorem introduced by An-
drew Gleason (1957). That is, my first claim is that Gleason’s theorem (GT), just like vNT, proves 
that in viable HVTs beables cannot be represented by Hermitian operators, but now on the basis of 
premises that are immune to the Hermann-Bell criticism. 
Second, I argue that if we read the KST in the light of vNT and GT, we see that the former does 
not really force HVTs to be contextual—at last not in the usual ontological reading of ‘contextual’—
so it does not really oblige them to make any important concessions in their basic motivation. As we 
will see, the reason is that the contextual-ontology reading of the KST crucially assumes that in HVTs 
Hermitian operators represent the theory’s beables, but this is forbidden by vNT and GT.  
In short, I claim that the customary understanding of the KST for the ontology of HVTs must be 
reassessed, and that the usual judgment about the relevance of the theorems is upside down.  That 
is, vNT (and also GT) imposes a deeper and more significant constraint on HVTs than the rather 
weak restriction that the KST really enforces. Actually, the latter does not compel viable HVTs to be 
contextual, in any interesting, or peculiarly quantum, sense of the term. 
In section 2, I present the KST, and I explain why it is generally interpreted as implying that the 
ontology of properties in HVTs must be contextual. In section 3, I focus on vNT. First, I present its 
logical structure, then Bell’s critique, and finally Jammer’s and Bub’s lucid reassessments. In section 
4, I show that GT proves the same result obtained by von Neumann. The upshot is that both theo-
rems prove that HVTs within Hilbert space—in which beables are represented by Hermitian opera-
tors—are not possible. In section 5, I first show that if we consider the restriction that both vNT and 
GT impose on HVTs, we realize that the KST has no bearing on the ontology of the beables in such 
theories, for the alleged ontological contextuality constraint crucially presupposes that beables in 
HVTs are indeed represented by Hermitian operators. Then, I clarify the real import of the KST for 
HVTs in the light of vNT and GT, illustrating with the case of Bohmian Mechanics, and comparing 
my proposal with Bell’s (1966) take on the KST. In section 6, I discuss an argument introduced by 
Meyer (1999), Kent (1999) and Clifton & Kent (2000) that intends to “nullify” the import of the KST. 
In section 7, I summarize and conclude. 
 
 
2. THE KOCHEN-SPECKER THEOREM 
The KST is well-known in the philosophy and foundations of physics community. I will present 
just the essential elements that motivate its usual interpretation, i.e., that it imposes a contextuality 
constraint on the ontology of beables in HVTs. In subsections 2.1 and 2.3, I follow the structure of 
Michael Redhead’s (1987) analysis. Redhead’s examination is very useful for our purposes. That the 
KST forces the beables in HVTs to be contextual is indeed a common belief, but it is not always 
precisely articulated. Redhead’s analysis makes that statement very clear. Besides, it is a good rep-
resentative of the usual interpretation—e.g., the entry on the KST in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy (Held 2018) closely follows Redhead’s analysis.6 
 
 
6 That this view is the most common does not mean that it is the only one. As we will see, Bell (1966) understood the 
theorem in a way that approaches the one I defend here. 
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2.1. HIDDEN VARIABLES AND THE FUNCTIONAL COMPOSITIONAL PRINCIPLE 
A HVT in Hilbert space can be naturally characterized by the following principles. Principle i) 
captures the spirit of HVTs in general, whereas ii) and iii) concern how a HVT in Hilbert space 
should represent its beables: 
 
i) A quantum system has definite values for all its beables simultaneously, at all times. 
 
ii) Given a Hermitian operator 𝑂𝑂, if there is an operationally defined real number 𝑜𝑜 that is prob-
abilistically distributed according to the statistical algorithm of the quantum formalism for 
𝑂𝑂—i.e., such that 𝜌𝜌(𝑜𝑜) = ⟨𝜓𝜓|𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑|𝜓𝜓⟩, or 𝜌𝜌(𝑜𝑜) = Tr𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑, where 𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑 is a projector in the spectral de-
composition of 𝑂𝑂—then there exists a beable 𝒪𝒪 associated with the number 𝑜𝑜 and that is meas-
ured by it. Thus, every Hermitian operator represents a beable. 
 
iii) To every beable of a system, there corresponds one and only one Hermitian operator as its 
mathematical representative. 
 
Consider now the following theorem in the quantum Hilbert space formalism. Take an arbitrary 
Hermitian operator 𝑂𝑂 representing observable 𝒪𝒪, and let Prob�𝑣𝑣(𝒪𝒪)|𝜓𝜓⟩ = 𝑜𝑜� = ⟨𝜓𝜓|𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑|𝜓𝜓⟩ denote the 
probability that 𝑣𝑣(𝒪𝒪)|𝜓𝜓⟩ = 𝑜𝑜, where 𝑣𝑣(𝒪𝒪)|𝜓𝜓⟩ is the value obtained in an 𝒪𝒪-measurement on a system 
in an arbitrary state |𝜓𝜓⟩, and 𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑 is a projector onto |𝜑𝜑⟩ in the spectrum of 𝑂𝑂, with eigenvalue 𝑜𝑜. It can 
be proven (see Redhead 1987, 18) that  
 
Prob�𝑣𝑣(𝑓𝑓(𝒪𝒪))|𝜓𝜓⟩ = 𝑜𝑜� = Prob�𝑓𝑓�𝑣𝑣(𝒪𝒪)|𝜓𝜓⟩� = 𝑜𝑜�, 
 
where 𝑓𝑓 is an arbitrary function, and 𝑓𝑓(𝒪𝒪) is the observable whose Hermitian operator is 𝑓𝑓(𝑂𝑂). Let 
us call this theorem STAT FUNC (for reasons that will be clear shortly). STAT FUNC holds in the 
quantum formalism independently of considerations about hidden variables. 
Let us now consider the functional compositional principle (FUNC), which states that in HVTs in 
Hilbert space the algebra of possessed values of beables mirrors the algebra of their representing Her-
mitian operators. That is, let 𝑣𝑣(𝒪𝒪)|𝜓𝜓⟩ now represent the value of a beable 𝒪𝒪 possessed by a quantum 
system in an arbitrary state |𝜓𝜓⟩, and let 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 be two Hermitian operators representing beables 𝒜𝒜 
and ℬ, respectively, such that 𝐵𝐵 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴), where 𝑓𝑓 is an arbitrary function. FUNC states that 
 
𝑣𝑣(ℬ)|𝜓𝜓⟩ = 𝑓𝑓�𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)|𝜓𝜓⟩�, 
 
or, alternatively, that 
 
𝑣𝑣(𝑓𝑓(𝒜𝒜))|𝜓𝜓⟩ = 𝑓𝑓�𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)|𝜓𝜓⟩�, 
 
where 𝑓𝑓(𝒜𝒜) is the beable whose Hermitian operator is 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴). 
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It turns out that FUNC—which is not a theorem in the quantum formalism—follows from the 
conjunction of i), ii, iii) and STAT FUNC. Take an arbitrary state |𝜓𝜓⟩ and, given iii), a beable 𝒜𝒜 rep-
resented by the operator 𝐴𝐴. By i), the system possesses a definite numerical value 𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)|𝜓𝜓⟩ for 𝒜𝒜. We 
can then form the number 𝑓𝑓�𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)|𝜓𝜓⟩� with an arbitrary function 𝑓𝑓. By STAT FUNC, 
 
Prob�𝑓𝑓�𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)|𝜓𝜓⟩� = 𝑏𝑏� = Prob�𝑣𝑣(𝑓𝑓(𝒜𝒜))|𝜓𝜓⟩ = 𝑏𝑏�, 
 
which implies that the number 𝑓𝑓�𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)|𝜓𝜓⟩� is probabilistically distributed by the statistical algorithm 
of the quantum formalism for the operator 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴). Thus, by ii), there is a beable ℬ represented by 𝐵𝐵 =
𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴), and measured by the number 𝑓𝑓�𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)|𝜓𝜓⟩�. In turn, by i), |𝜓𝜓⟩ has a definite value 𝑣𝑣(ℬ)|𝜓𝜓⟩ for ℬ. 
Finally, by ii) and iii), ℬ is the only beable corresponding to 𝐵𝐵 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴), so that 𝑣𝑣(ℬ)|𝜓𝜓⟩ = 𝑓𝑓�𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)|𝜓𝜓⟩�, 
which is FUNC. In short, although FUNC is not a theorem in the quantum formalism, it does hold 
in HVTs characterized by i), ii) and iii).  
If we read STAT FUNC as the statistical version of FUNC, that is, as a statement about long-run 
measured frequencies of possessed beable values, we can derive it from FUNC. If the algebra of pos-
sessed values mirrors the algebra of the corresponding operators (FUNC), so must the long-run fre-
quencies of the measured values (STAT FUNC).7 In other words, HVTs characterized by i), ii) and 
iii) offer a natural explanation of STAT FUNC. 
Let now 𝑄𝑄 be an arbitrary non-degenerate Hermitian operator in a Hilbert space ℋ of dimension 
3 or greater, with eigenvalues 𝑞𝑞1, 𝑞𝑞2, 𝑞𝑞3, …, and eigenvectors |𝑞𝑞1⟩, |𝑞𝑞2⟩, |𝑞𝑞3⟩, …. Then take the projec-
tors 𝑃𝑃1,𝑃𝑃2,𝑃𝑃3, … onto |𝑞𝑞1⟩, |𝑞𝑞2⟩, |𝑞𝑞3⟩,…, respectively. From FUNC and the properties of projectors, it 
can be proven (see Redhead 1987, 121-123) that 
 
𝑣𝑣(𝒫𝒫𝑖𝑖)|𝜓𝜓⟩ = 1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 0, 
and that 
𝑣𝑣(𝒫𝒫1)|𝜓𝜓⟩ + 𝑣𝑣(𝒫𝒫2)|𝜓𝜓⟩ + 𝑣𝑣(𝒫𝒫3)|𝜓𝜓⟩ + ⋯ = 1 
 
Thus, an assignment of values for the beables 𝒫𝒫𝑖𝑖 is constrained by FUNC in such a way that one of 
them must have value 1, while the rest must have value 0.  
An arbitrary choice of several non-commuting 𝑄𝑄,𝑄𝑄′,𝑄𝑄′′, … with corresponding orthogonal projec-
tors 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖′,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖′′, … determines a collection of sets of orthogonal rays in ℋ (one set for the 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, one set for 
the 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖′ , and so on). Thus, the constraint imposed by FUNC on the value assignments for the 
𝒫𝒫𝑖𝑖 ,𝒫𝒫𝑖𝑖′,𝒫𝒫𝑖𝑖′′, … amounts to an equivalent constraint on an assignment of numbers for the rays in each 
set.  
Given i) and ii), the assignment must be complete: no ray can be left unassigned. That is, a FUNC-
constrained complete assignment of values for our rays must be such that, in each and every set, one 
ray is assigned the number 1 while the rest are assigned the number 0. Now, since the dimension of 
ℋ is at least 3, the chosen 𝑄𝑄,𝑄𝑄′,𝑄𝑄′′, … may be such that some pairs of operators share an eigenvector, 
so the same ray may belong to more than one set. Given iii), the assignment must be consistent, in 
7 Assuming that measurements are faithful, in the sense that the possessed beable value just before the measurement 
is the same value that the measurement yields. 
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the sense that each ray must be unambiguously assigned a single number in all the sets it belongs 
to, otherwise we would have a complete but contradictory assignment of beable values.8 
In short, our main result so far is the following: a HVT characterized by i), ii) and iii) is necessarily 
committed to a complete and consistent FUNC-constrained assignment of possessed beable values. 
 
2.2. THE THEOREM 
The KST is a proof of the impossibility of a FUNC-constrained complete and consistent assign-
ment for all the projectors, or the corresponding rays, in a Hilbert space of dimension 3 and higher. 
The proof proceeds by illustrating the impossibility of the assignment for a given collection of triads 
of orthogonal rays in ℋ3. That is, given a certain collection of triads, the theorem shows that any 
attempt to implement a FUNC-constrained complete and consistent assignment leads to a contra-
diction. Kochen and Specker’s (1967) proof involves 117 rays, but later proofs that are much more 
economic. Peres (1991) presents a very simple and elegant one using only 33 rays.9 
A subtle point that will be crucial below is the following. Consider for a moment the KST no-go 
result from a strictly mathematical point of view. That is, given our collection of triads of orthogonal 
rays, it is impossible to assign in each triad the number 1 to one ray and the number 0 to the others 
in a complete and consistent way, whatever the physical meaning we assign to the rays may be. Now, we 
may interpret this mathematical fact, in physical terms, in a stronger or a in a weaker way. In the 
stronger reading—as in Redhead’s analysis—the FUNC-constrained complete and consistent as-
signment of values is an assignment of possessed beable values, so we obviously assume that the Her-
mitian operators that determine the rays are representatives of beables. Thus, as an instance of the 
stronger reading, which is the usual way to understand the theorem in its relevance for HVTs, what 
Redhead shows is that a HVT in Hilbert space characterized by i), ii) and iii), is doomed to fall prey 
to the KST contradiction. 
However, we could also take a weaker standpoint and simply assume that the operators represent 
observables (see fn. 5). In this case, the impossible assignment is an assignment of (eigen)values as 
numerical outcomes of experiments. But then the KST must be stated in counterfactual terms. That is, if 
a measurement of observable 𝒫𝒫𝑖𝑖 (whose operator 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓𝑄𝑄 = 𝑔𝑔𝑄𝑄′ projects onto a ray shared by the 
spectra of the non-commuting operators 𝑄𝑄 and 𝑄𝑄′) yields an (eigen)value 1 when measured through 
𝒬𝒬, then if it would have been measured through 𝒬𝒬′ we would have obtained an (eigen)value 0. In 
this weaker way to understand it, the KST imposes a constraint only on the (counterfactual) phenom-
enology of any quantum theory. So, if the KST is to have any ontological import on the beables in HVTs, 
these must be assumed to be represented by Hermitian operators, as in Redhead’s stronger con-
strual.  
8 It is sometimes stated that this consistency constraint amounts to a non-contextuality assumption (e.g., see Held 2018). 
I think the theorem is better presented if we refrain from using the “(non)contextuality” talk until the no-go result 
is derived. If non-contextuality lies on the consistency requirement, then the rejection of that requirement (the rejection 
of iii)) should lead to a form of contextuality. But, as we will see, the KST imposes a contextuality constraint also if 
either i) or ii) is rejected.  
9 Some approaches treat the KST vis-à-vis Bell’s theorem, with the aim of addressing the connections between con-
textuality and non-locality. As Aravind (1999) shows, proofs of the KST can be turned into Bell’s theorem proofs. 
The KS-Bell proofs, though, require entangled states, whereas the KST holds for arbitrary states. We are interested 
in the KST in the light of vNT and GT, which do not restrict their scope to entangled states either. Besides, a state-
independent approach is adequate for addressing the ontological import of the KST. 
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It seems natural then to consider the strong interpretation in order to address the relevance of the 
KST for HVTs, which explains why an analysis like Redhead’s has become the usual stance on the 
theorem. Let us thus take a closer look at the nature of the ontological contextuality for beables that 
follows from the strong reading. 
 
2.3. ONTOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALITY 
A HVT that observes i), ii), and iii) would not be affected by the measurement problem, and it 
would naturally explain the probabilistic nature of the predictions of the quantum formalism: like 
in statistical mechanics, the probabilities would be a matter of our ignorance. Besides, FUNC would 
be a logical consequence in it, so the theory would also provide a natural explanation of STAT 
FUNC. Hence the alleged relevance of the KST: a theory observing i), ii) and iii) yields a FUNC-
constrained complete and consistent assignment of values for the beables of a system, but the KST 
shows that such an assignment is impossible.  
To further illustrate, let 𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵 and 𝐶𝐶 be Hermitian operators that share an eigenvector, and such 
that 𝐶𝐶 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴) = 𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵)  and [𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵] ≠ 0 , whereas [𝐶𝐶,𝐴𝐴] = [𝐶𝐶,𝐵𝐵] = 0. 10 FUNC imposes that 𝑣𝑣(𝒞𝒞)|𝜓𝜓⟩ =
𝑓𝑓�𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)|𝜓𝜓⟩� = 𝑔𝑔�𝑣𝑣(ℬ)|𝜓𝜓⟩�, but the KST shows that there is no complete and consistent assignment of 
values that observes this constraint. Thus, by modus tollens, the KST compels HVTs to drop one of 
the assumptions i), ii), iii) (recall that STAT FUNC is a theorem). Now, the rejection of any of the 
three assumptions implies some form of contextuality: 
 
a) By dropping i) a system can have definite values at all times for a certain set of beables, but 
not for all of them. For beables like 𝒞𝒞, the system possesses a definite value only relatively to 
a specific context of measurement, i.e., depending on whether we measure 𝒞𝒞 via 𝒜𝒜 or via ℬ—
so that it is possible that 𝑓𝑓�𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)|𝜓𝜓⟩� ≠ 𝑔𝑔�𝑣𝑣(ℬ)|𝜓𝜓⟩�. 
 
b) We drop ii) by stating that even though the numbers 𝑓𝑓�𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)|𝜓𝜓⟩� and 𝑔𝑔�𝑣𝑣(ℬ)|𝜓𝜓⟩� are both 
probabilistically distributed by the statistical algorithm of the quantum formalism for 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴) 
and 𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵), respectively, 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴) represents a beable, but 𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵) does not. This amounts to state that 
whether 𝐶𝐶 represents a beable or not depends on the measurement context: measuring beable 
𝒜𝒜  and applying 𝑓𝑓  yields a beable value, but measuring beable ℬ  and applying 𝑔𝑔  yields a 
physically meaningless number.  
 
c) Dropping iii) by stating that 𝐶𝐶  represents two different beables 𝑓𝑓(𝒜𝒜) and 𝑔𝑔(ℬ) introduces 
contextuality insofar as which beable 𝐶𝐶 represents each time depends on the context of meas-
urement. 
 
10 If a Hermitian operator 𝐶𝐶 is degenerate, it can be written as a function of an infinite number of different nondegen-
erate Hermitian operators, where all such operators that 𝐶𝐶 is a function of do not commute with each other, though 
𝐶𝐶 commutes with each one of them (see Redhead 1987, 19-22). Intuitively, we only need to fix the shared eigenvector 
and rotate the triad about it to obtain infinitely many triads corresponding to infinitely many operators that do not 
commute with 𝐴𝐴, but that do commute with 𝐶𝐶. 
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All three options have radical consequences for the ontology of beables. Strategy a) involves a 
compromise in the spirit of HVTs. The gist of these theories assumes that there is an external deter-
minate quantum reality in which physical systems have definite values for all its properties at all 
times, regardless of whether measurements are performed or not. However, the rejection of i) im-
plies a Bohrian ontological description of the contextual beables: they cannot have definite values 
independently of measurements. HVTs aim to remove fuzziness or indeterminacy for beable values, 
but for contextual beables like 𝒞𝒞, fuzziness and indeterminacy come up anyway.  
Strategy b) leaves us in a scenario in which even though 𝐶𝐶 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴) = 𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵), where 𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵 and 𝐶𝐶 rep-
resent the beables 𝒜𝒜, ℬ and 𝒞𝒞, respectively, either 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴) or 𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵) does not represent a beable. Now, 
the idea that even though 𝒜𝒜 and ℬ are both beables, if we apply a function on one of the representa-
tive operators we define a new beable, whereas if we do the same with the other operator no beable 
gets defined, is hard to justify. It is difficult to conceive a physically plausible criterion to ground 
this disparity. 
Finally, strategy c) involves an infinite multiplication of beables for operators like 𝐶𝐶 (see fn. 10). 
Apart from this seemingly ad-hoc de-Ockhamization of properties, further ontological questions en-
sue. For example, let us take again the operator 𝐶𝐶 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴) = 𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵) which in this view represents (at 
least) two different beables. In an 𝒜𝒜-measurement, the value of 𝑓𝑓(𝒜𝒜) depends on the value of the 
beable 𝒜𝒜. But what about the value of 𝑓𝑓(𝒜𝒜) in a ℬ-measurement context? Is the beable 𝑓𝑓(𝒜𝒜) still an 
element of reality in that case? If it is, does its value depend on 𝑣𝑣(𝒜𝒜)? Can we alter the value of 
𝑓𝑓(𝒜𝒜), or turn off the beable itself from existence, just by switching between an 𝒜𝒜-measurement con-
text and a ℬ-measurement context? 
As I mentioned above, Redhead’s analysis of the structure and premises of the theorem is very 
useful here. By showing that the conjunction of STAT FUNC, i), ii), and iii) leads to the KST contra-
diction, it allows us to precisely spell out the types of contextuality that the theorem allegedly im-
poses on HVTs in Hilbert space. Most importantly, when contextuality is described accurately in the 
discussion of the theorem, we see that in all three forms it concerns the ontology of beables in HVTs. 
Alternatives b) and c) are rarely defended in the literature, though, and the KST is usually taken 
to compel HVTs to choose a). Bub (1997), for example, characterized the challenge of a realist inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics as finding out what is the maximum number of beables that can 
have objective definite values without falling prey to the KST (notice that Bub’s is yet another exam-
ple of the usual interpretation of the KST). However, Redhead’s analysis is useful in clarifying that 
i) can be retained, but on the price of some other bizarre forms of ontological contextuality. 
Summarizing so far, a HVT characterized by i), ii) and iii) is necessarily committed to a FUNC-
constrained complete and consistent assignment of beables values. The KST shows that such an as-
signment is impossible, so it forces HVTs in Hilbert space to drop either i), ii), or iii). In turn, this 




3. VON NEUMANN’S THEOREM 
In 1932, in his seminal Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, John von Neumann (1955) 
derived a theorem that was understood by many as a proof of the impossibility of such theories (but 
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see fn. 3). John Bell (1966) contested this reading, and claimed that the only relevance of vNT consists 
in that it rules out an uninteresting class of HVTs. However, Jammer (1974) and Bub (2010, 2011) 
have shown that vNT does convey an interesting result. Jammer states that the theorem proves that 
quantum mechanics cannot be embedded in a HVT within Hilbert space, and Bub states that the 
theorem establishes that in HVTs the beables of quantum systems cannot be represented by Hermit-
ian operators. vNT is mostly known through Bell’s (1966) article, that does not present the proof in 
detail. However, an accurate understanding of its true meaning requires a more detailed scrutiny. 
 
3.1. THE PROOF 
In 1932, von Neumann (1955) published his seminal Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechan-
ics. There he showed that the quantum theory that Heisenberg, Jordan & Born (1926) and Schrö-
dinger (1926) had articulated in the form of matrix and wave mechanics, respectively, could be sol-
idly and elegantly formulated in the mathematical framework that we nowadays call Hilbert space. 
In section III.1 of his book, he showed that a generalized expression for the Born rule could be for-
mulated in Hilbert space in the following way, where 𝑈𝑈 is a density operator, and 𝑅𝑅 is a Hermitian 
operator representing observable ℛ: 
 
〈ℛ〉𝑈𝑈 = Tr(𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅)                                                                              (1) 
 
Given the probabilistic character of (1), in chapter IV von Neumann ponders if it could be inter-
preted in a classical way, that is, as a matter of our ignorance. To treat this issue he introduces two 
definitions. First, a state 𝑈𝑈 is dispersion-free iff there is no statistical spread in the predictions of meas-
urement outcomes, i.e., such that for every ℛ,  
 
〈ℛ〉𝑈𝑈2 = 〈ℛ2〉𝑈𝑈 
 
Second, a system is in a homogeneous state 𝑈𝑈 iff for any subensembles 𝑈𝑈1 and 𝑈𝑈2,  
 
〈ℛ〉𝑈𝑈 = 〈ℛ〉𝑈𝑈1 = 〈ℛ〉𝑈𝑈2  
 
By definition, in a HVT that provides an ignorance interpretation of (1), there must be dispersion-
free states. Furthermore, since from a HVT perspective a dispersive state is not completely described, 
such a system could be split into dispersion-free subsystems, according to suitable values of the 
hidden variables. Thus, in a HVT, a dispersive state cannot be homogeneous.  
Von Neumann then introduces four “general qualitative assumptions” (1955, 295): 
  
A’. If observable ℛ is by nature a non-negative quantity, then 〈ℛ〉 ≥ 0. 
B’. If ℛ,𝒮𝒮, … are arbitrary observables and 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, … are real numbers, then 〈𝑎𝑎ℛ + 𝑏𝑏𝒮𝒮 + ⋯〉 = 𝑎𝑎〈ℛ〉 +
𝑏𝑏〈𝒮𝒮〉 + ⋯. 
I. If the observable ℛ is represented by the Hermitian operator 𝑅𝑅, then the observable 𝑓𝑓(ℛ) is rep-
resented by the Hermitian operator 𝑓𝑓(𝑅𝑅). 
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II. If observables ℛ and 𝒮𝒮 are represented by the Hermitian operators 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑆𝑆, respectively, the 
observable ℛ + 𝑆𝑆 is represented by the Hermitian operator 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆, regardless of whether 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑆𝑆 
commute or not. 
 
From these four assumptions, von Neumann (1955, 313-317) derives (1), and then he shows that it 
does not allow dispersion-free states, whereas it does admit homogeneous ones.  
The proof that there are no dispersion-free states is simple (von Neumann 1955, 320-321). Recall 
that a deterministic state 𝑈𝑈 is such that [Tr(𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅)]2 = Tr(𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅2). Choosing for 𝑅𝑅 a projector 𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑 onto an 
arbitrary normalized vector |𝜑𝜑⟩, the idempotency of 𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑 implies that [Tr(𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑)]2 = Tr(𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑), so that 
⟨𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑|𝑈𝑈|𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑⟩2 = ⟨𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑|𝑈𝑈|𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑⟩, and then ⟨𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑|𝑈𝑈|𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑⟩ must equal 1 or 0. Let us now take two normalized vec-
tors |𝜑𝜑′⟩ and |𝜑𝜑′′⟩, and vary continuously from one to the other (von Neumann proved that all vec-
tors |𝜑𝜑⟩ along the variation are normalized). Since the vector variation is continuous, the variation 
from ⟨𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑′|𝑈𝑈|𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑′⟩ to ⟨𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑′′|𝑈𝑈|𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑′′⟩ must also be continuous. Thus, given that ⟨𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑|𝑈𝑈|𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑⟩ has to be either 
1 or 0, ⟨𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑|𝑈𝑈|𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑⟩ must be constant along the variation, and ⟨𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑′|𝑈𝑈|𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑′⟩ = ⟨𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑′′|𝑈𝑈|𝑃𝑃𝜑𝜑′′⟩. Thus, along the 
whole variation either 𝑈𝑈 = 𝐼𝐼 or 𝑈𝑈 = 0. But Tr𝑈𝑈 = 1, so no 𝑈𝑈 can be dispersion-free. 
The proof that there are homogeneous states (von Neumann 1955, 321-322) is somewhat more 
involved. Let 𝑈𝑈1  and 𝑈𝑈2  be any subensembles of 𝑈𝑈, and assume 𝑈𝑈 is homogeneous. With 𝑐𝑐′ > 0, 
𝑐𝑐′′ > 0, and 𝑐𝑐′ + 𝑐𝑐′′ = 1, it follows from the homogeneity condition above that 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑐𝑐′𝑈𝑈1 + 𝑐𝑐′′𝑈𝑈2 im-





∙ 𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑+⟩, 𝑊𝑊|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑⟩ − 𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑⟩ 
 
where |𝜑𝜑⟩ is any vector. Von Neumann proved that 𝑉𝑉 and 𝑊𝑊 are positive definite. Thus, given that 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑉𝑉 + 𝑊𝑊, if 𝑈𝑈 is homogeneous, then 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑐𝑐′𝑈𝑈; and since 𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑+⟩ = 𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑+⟩, 𝑐𝑐′ = 1, so that 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑈𝑈. Von 
Neumann then defined the normalized vector |𝜓𝜓⟩ = 𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑+⟩‖𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑+⟩‖ and the constant 𝑐𝑐 =
‖𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑+⟩‖2
�𝜑𝜑+�𝑈𝑈�𝜑𝜑+�
 to obtain 
 
𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 𝑐𝑐|𝜓𝜓⟩⟨𝜓𝜓|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝜓𝜓|𝜑𝜑⟩, 
 
so that 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑃𝑃𝜓𝜓. That is, if 𝑈𝑈 is homogenous, it is a projector.  
Conversely, assume that 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑃𝑃𝜓𝜓, where |𝜓𝜓⟩ is normalized, and that 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑉𝑉 + 𝑊𝑊, where 𝑉𝑉 and 𝑊𝑊 
are positive definite. Then for any vector |𝜑𝜑⟩, 0 ≤ ⟨𝜑𝜑|𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑⟩ ≤ ⟨𝜑𝜑|𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑⟩ + ⟨𝜑𝜑|𝑊𝑊|𝜑𝜑⟩ = ⟨𝜑𝜑|𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑⟩. But if 
𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 0, then ⟨𝜑𝜑|𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 0, so that ⟨𝜑𝜑|𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 0, and 𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 0. That is, if 𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 0, then 𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 0. 
Now, for any vector |𝜑𝜑⟩ orthogonal to |𝜓𝜓⟩, 𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 0, for if ⟨𝜑𝜑|𝜓𝜓⟩ = 0, then 𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 𝑃𝑃𝜓𝜓|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 0, and 
𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 0. Now, since for any vector |𝜃𝜃⟩ it holds that ⟨𝜃𝜃|𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑⟩ = ⟨𝜑𝜑|𝑉𝑉|𝜃𝜃⟩, any vector |𝜑𝜑⟩ that is orthog-
onal to |𝜓𝜓⟩ (so that 𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 0) is orthogonal to 𝑉𝑉|𝜃𝜃⟩ as well. Hence, 𝑉𝑉|𝜃𝜃⟩ = 𝑐𝑐𝜃𝜃|𝜓𝜓⟩, where 𝑐𝑐 depends on 
|𝜃𝜃⟩. So if |𝜃𝜃⟩ = |𝜓𝜓⟩, then 𝑉𝑉|𝜓𝜓⟩ = 𝑐𝑐′|𝜓𝜓⟩. Now, any vector |𝜑𝜑⟩ can be written in the form ⟨𝜓𝜓|𝜑𝜑⟩|𝜓𝜓⟩ + |𝜑𝜑′⟩, 
where |𝜑𝜑′⟩ is orthogonal to |𝜓𝜓⟩. Therefore, 
 
𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑⟩ = ⟨𝜓𝜓|𝜑𝜑⟩ ⋅ 𝑉𝑉|𝜓𝜓⟩ + 𝑉𝑉|𝜑𝜑′⟩ = 𝑐𝑐′|𝜓𝜓⟩⟨𝜓𝜓|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 𝑐𝑐′𝑃𝑃𝜓𝜓|𝜑𝜑⟩ = 𝑐𝑐′𝑈𝑈|𝜑𝜑⟩ 
and finally, 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑐𝑐′𝑈𝑈 and 𝑊𝑊 = 𝑈𝑈 − 𝑉𝑉 = (1 − 𝑐𝑐′)𝑈𝑈. That is, if 𝑈𝑈 is a projector, it is homogeneous. 
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We have then a proof that 𝑈𝑈 is homogeneous iff it is a projector. Thus, the quantum states allowed 
by (1) are always dispersive, and some of them are homogeneous. It follows that under assumptions 
A’, B’, I and II, HVTs are not possible.  
Notice that this result involves two main steps. First, a derivation of (1) using A’, B’, I and II; and 
then a proof that (1) does not allow dispersion-free states but allows homogeneous states, in which 
premise B’ is not used—although the result of the second step is conditional on the premises in the 
first step, of course. Most accounts of vNT follow Bell’s (1966) exposition, but the reader familiar 
with it will notice that the present review, which follows von Neumann quite closely, is significantly 
different from Bell’s presentation. As we will see, a faithful display of von Neumann’s two steps is 
crucial in order to properly understand the significance of the theorem, and to understand why GT 
is another proof of the same result on the basis of weaker assumptions. 
 
3.2. BELL’S CRITIQUE 
Bell claims that the main assumption in vNT is that “any linear combination of any two Hermitian 
operators represents an observable, and the same combination of expectation values is the expecta-
tion value of the combination” (1966, 448), that is, II and B’. He then asserts that this assumption “is 
required by von Neumann of the hypothetical dispersion-free states also”. Now, “for a dispersion-
free state (which has no statistical character) the expectation value of an observable must equal one 
of its eigenvalues” (1966, 449). But if an observable 𝒪𝒪 is represented by 𝑂𝑂 = 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆, where [𝑅𝑅, 𝑆𝑆] ≠ 0, 
the eigenvalues of 𝑂𝑂 are, in general, not equal to a sum of the eigenvalues of 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑆𝑆. According to 
Bell, von Neumann then concludes that dispersion-free states—and hence HVTs—are tout court im-
possible. 
The core of Bell’s criticism of vNT is his rejection of B’ for dispersion-free states: 
 
The essential assumption can be criticized as follows. At first sight the required additivity of expecta-
tion values seems very reasonable, and it is rather the nonadditivity of allowed values (eigenvalues) 
which requires explanation. Of course the explanation is well known: a measurement of a sum of 
noncommuting observables cannot be made by combining trivially the results of separate observa-
tions of the two terms—it requires a quite different experiment. (Bell 1966, 449) 
 
 
As an example, Bell refers to the operator 𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦, representing the spin observable 𝒮𝒮𝑥𝑥 + 𝒮𝒮𝑦𝑦. The 
eigenvalues of 𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥  and 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦  are ±1, but the eigenvalues of 𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥 + 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦  are ±√2, so von Neumann’s (al-
leged) constraint cannot be observed. However, since �𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥 ,𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦� ≠ 0, 𝒮𝒮𝑥𝑥 + 𝒮𝒮𝑦𝑦 cannot be measured by 
adding the values obtained in separate measurements of 𝒮𝒮𝑥𝑥 and 𝒮𝒮𝑦𝑦. Thus, the non-additivity of the 
expected values of 𝒮𝒮𝑥𝑥 + 𝒮𝒮𝑦𝑦 for dispersion-free states is natural, despite the additivity of the statistical 
expectation values.  
Bell then states that the theorem does not support von Neumann’s (supposed) conclusion that 
HVTs with dispersion-free states are impossible: 
 
It was not the objective measurable predictions of quantum mechanics which ruled out hidden varia-
bles. It was the arbitrary assumption of a particular (and impossible) relation between the results of 
incompatible measurements either of which might be made on a given occasion but only one of which 





Thus, Bell shows that vNT does not prove that HVTs are impossible. His criticism goes further, 
though: since the imposition of B’ on dispersion-free states is, he claims, unjustified, the theorem 
does not have much importance: it only rules out the uninteresting class of HVTs that observe B’. 
This has become the general opinion in the philosophy and foundations of physics community. 
 
3.3. A REASSESSMENT 
Bell complains that for incompatible measurements, additivity of expectation values for determin-
istic states, i.e., B’, is an unjustified assumption. However, von Neumann does offer arguments for 
the four assumptions, including B’. A’ is practically analytic, and required to prove that in (1) 𝑈𝑈 is 
positive-definite (von Neumann 1955, 317). The justification for I and II corresponds to the repre-
sentation of quantities by Hermitian operators. Von Neumann explicitly remarks that “in quantum 
mechanics […], the quantities ℛ correspond one-to-one to the hypermaximal Hermitian operators 
𝑅𝑅” (1955, 247). Then, commenting on II, he adds that “this operation depends on the fact that for 
two Hermitian operators, 𝑅𝑅, 𝑆𝑆, the sum 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆 is also a Hermitian operator, even if the 𝑅𝑅, 𝑆𝑆 do not 
commute” (1955, 309). I and II thus guarantee that the functional relations between the represented 
quantities (beables, if we discuss HVTs) are mirrored by the representing operators. 
Regarding B’, von Neumann introduces it on the grounds of a general principle in physical rea-
soning, and in order to guarantee the functional mirroring established by I and II for beables of the 
form ℛ + 𝒮𝒮, when [𝑅𝑅, 𝑆𝑆] ≠ 0. Just before addressing the subject of expectation values as a prelimi-
nary for the theorem, von Neumann asks the reader to “forget the whole of quantum mechanics”, 
but retaining the following basic principle (1955, 297). If we measure a quantity ℜ on a system 𝑺𝑺 and 
obtain a value 𝑎𝑎, then we can always take a function 𝐟𝐟(𝑥𝑥), define the quantity 𝐟𝐟(ℜ), and obtain the 
value 𝐟𝐟(𝑎𝑎) (this is the general foundation for I, of course). 
But assume now (still independently of quantum theory) that the quantities ℜ and 𝔖𝔖 are experi-
mentally incompatible. It seems problematic to even define a quantity 𝐟𝐟(ℜ,𝔖𝔖), for there is no possi-
ble experimental setup that can measure ℜ and 𝔖𝔖 simultaneously, nor successively on a system in 
the same state. However, von Neumann (1955, 298-300) refers to an ensemble of systems 𝑺𝑺1, 
𝑺𝑺2, … ,𝑺𝑺𝑁𝑁, with 𝑁𝑁 large. In measurements on this ensemble, we do not get the value of a quantity, but 
a distribution of values. Now, even if two quantities ℜ and 𝔖𝔖 are incompatible, we can take different 
subsets of the ensemble, with 𝑀𝑀 elements (where 𝑀𝑀 ≪ 𝑁𝑁, but 𝑀𝑀 large), and separately measure ℜ 
and 𝔖𝔖 in these sub-ensembles. These measurements yield the statistical distribution of both ℜ and 
𝔖𝔖 for the whole ensemble, and with these distributions we are now able to define our quantity 
𝐟𝐟(ℜ,𝔖𝔖) anyway. In order to do this, we must assume that B’ holds for the expectation values of ensembles. 
Thus, von Neumann’s justification for this assumption is that it is required to functionally define 
quantities that are a linear combination of experimentally incompatible observables. In other words 
(and now returning to quantum theory), in order to extract the full representational power of Hilbert 
space according to I and II, i.e., respecting the principle that the functional relations between quan-
tities are mirrored by the representing operators, B’ is required. Thus, B’, more than a physical as-
sumption, is a principle that allows the definition of quantities like 𝐟𝐟(ℜ,𝔖𝔖). 
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Although von Neumann is not explicit about it, a very important point to notice here is that this 
rationale for B’ does not require that the expectation values must be probabilistically spread. Von 
Neumann’s argument simply allows us to deal with the experimental incompatibility between the 
quantities ℜ and 𝔖𝔖 that seems to jeopardize the definition of the quantity 𝐟𝐟(ℜ,𝔖𝔖)—recall that he asks 
us to forget quantum mechanics for a second. Actually, this reasoning to deal with experimentally 
incompatible quantities would also be applicable in a context in which the measurements on the 
sub-ensembles yield deterministic outcomes. It is not the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics 
that complicates the possibility of functionally defining 𝐟𝐟(ℜ,𝔖𝔖), but the experimental incompatibil-
ity between ℜ and 𝔖𝔖. Consequently, there are no reasons to restrain the scope of B’ to dispersive 
states. Actually, since von Neumann is pondering about the possibility of deterministic states in 
quantum mechanics, it is quite natural that he does not do it. 
Von Neumann (1955, 309, fn. 164) offers an example of his justification of B’ referring to the energy 
operator 𝐻𝐻, which is a linear combination of the non-commuting position and momentum operators, 
that is 𝐻𝐻 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑄𝑄) + 𝑔𝑔(𝑃𝑃). Although the energy quantity ℰ cannot be measured by measuring simul-
taneously or successively the incompatible quantities position 𝒬𝒬 and momentum 𝒫𝒫, ℰ can still be 
defined as a function of 𝒬𝒬 and 𝒫𝒫 through their expectation values, i.e., 〈ℰ〉 = 𝑓𝑓〈𝒬𝒬〉 + 𝑔𝑔〈𝒫𝒫〉. In other 
words, without B’ we could not define energy as ℰ = 𝐟𝐟(𝒬𝒬,𝒫𝒫)—and, again, this reasoning does not 
need to assume that the expectation values have to be dispersive. 
In short, von Neumann’s reasoning is that I and II must be taken on board if we are going to use 
Hilbert space in its full representative power, following the general principle in physical reasoning 
that he asks us to retain. But given the experimental incompatibility between some quantities—those 
represented by non-commuting operators—B’ is needed to guarantee that representative power. 
That is, although B’ and II are logically independent, given that Hermitian operators in Hilbert space 
do not all commute, they are essentially linked in physical terms. 
After our analysis of von Neumann’s justification for B’, we can formulate the true meaning and 
relevance of his theorem. In 1935, Grete Hermann (2016, section 7) introduced a criticism that is 
similar in spirit to Bell’s, and Max Jammer (1974, 272-275) offered a critical evaluation of Hermann’s 
argument that clarifies the true significance of vNT. Hermann claimed that the proof is circular. 
Recall that B’ states that 〈ℛ + 𝒮𝒮〉 = 〈ℛ〉 + 〈𝒮𝒮〉, even if [𝑅𝑅, 𝑆𝑆] ≠ 0. She points out that when [𝑅𝑅, 𝑆𝑆] ≠ 0, 
the expectation values of putative dispersion-free states for the beable ℛ + 𝒮𝒮 may not be additive, 
given the value of the hidden variables. But then, when the dispersion-free states get averaged over 
values of the hidden variables in an ensemble, the expectation value may be indeed additive. Thus, 
Hermann claims, vNT begs the question insofar as B’ precludes the possibility of dispersion-free 
states: if 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑆𝑆 do not commute, deterministic states cannot observe B’. 
Jammer states that although Hermann’s criticism—just like Bell’s—correctly points out that vNT 
is not a proof of the absolute impossibility of HVTs, her charge that the proof is circular is wrong, 
for B’ is not imposed on incompatible quantities and non-commuting operators only. That is, disper-
sion-free states for compatible quantities represented by commuting operators are logically con-
sistent with B’, so the theorem is not question-begging. Now, although Jammer rightly rejects the 
circularity claim, he states that Hermann’s argument allows us to properly understand the scope of 
vNT. By calling complete a theory that cannot be embedded in a HVT, he affirms that the insight in 
13 
 
Hermann’s criticism is that “von Neumann has proved that quantum mechanics is a complete the-
ory, but only as far as quantum mechanical states are concerned” (1974, 273; my emphasis). He elaborates 
on this point in the following way: 
 
We agree with Grete Hermann’s criticism that the proof did not achieve its declared objective of 
demonstrating that quantum mechanical ensembles cannot be decomposed into any kind of disper-
sion-free subensembles […]. But we do not dismiss the proof as nugatory. True, in view of von Neu-
mann’s excessively restricted assumptions it is not an impossibility proof of any conceivable class of 
hidden variables, but it is a completeness proof, in this respect, of von Neumann’s axiomatics (with the 
inclusion of postulate [B’]), since it shows that this formalism does not admit nonquantum mechanical 
[dispersion-free] ensembles. (Jammer 1974, 274, fn. 45) 
 
 
Given Jammer’s definition of “complete”, it is clear that he is not taking sides with Bohr in the 
Einstein-Bohr debate. He actually states that Hermann’s argument shows that vNT is not a proof of 
the completeness, in Einstein’s sense of “complete”, of quantum mechanics, for HVTs are still possible. 
Rather, he argues, what the theorem really shows is that the standard quantum formalism (von Neu-
mann’s axiomatization) is complete in the sense that it cannot be embedded in a HVT in Hilbert 
space. In short, and using “complete” in a more comprehensive sense, Jammer’s point is that vNT is 
a proof that quantum mechanics cannot be completed by a HVT within Hilbert space. 
More recently, Jeffrey Bub (2010; 2011) presented a reassessment of vNT along the same lines as 
Jammer. Paying close attention to the logical structure of the theorem, that is, that by assuming A’, 
B’, I and II dispersion-free states are not possible, we see its real significance. Since, for HVTs, B’, I 
and II amount to the principle that beables are represented by Hermitian operators in Hilbert space, 
he concludes that vNT is a proof that in viable HVTs such operators cannot be the representatives 
of the beables that configure their ontology: 
 
what von Neumann’s proof precludes, then, is the class of hidden variable theories in which i) disper-
sion-free (deterministic) states are the extremal states, and ii) the beables of the hidden variable theory 




After Bub’s clarification, we can properly understand von Neumann’s assessment of the im-
portance of his proof in connection to the possibility of HVTs. He focuses on I and II as the assump-
tions that HVTs which admit dispersion-free states should violate: 
  
We have even ascertained that it is impossible that the same physical quantities exist with the same 
function connections (i.e., that I, II hold), if other variables (i.e., “hidden parameters”) should exist in 
addition to the wavefunction. (von Neumann 1955, 324-325)11   
11 In this passage von Neumann does not claim that HVTs are tout court impossible. However, a few lines after he 
writes “it is therefore not, as is often assumed, a question of a re-interpretation of quantum mechanics—the present 
system of quantum mechanics would have to be objectively false, in order that another description of the elementary 
processes than the statistical one be possible” (1955, 325). Whether von Neumann understood his theorem (wrongly) 




                                                            
 
Bell, though, claimed that B’ is the assumption to blame, so let us see what happens in a generic 
Hilbert space HVT that drops B’ for deterministic states. Let ℛ and 𝒮𝒮 be two experimentally incom-
patible beables, represented by Hermitian operators 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑆𝑆, respectively. For dispersion-free states, 
the expectation values 〈ℛ〉 and 〈𝒮𝒮〉 are given by eigenvalues of 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑆𝑆, respectively. Now, for bea-
ble 𝒬𝒬, represented by the operator 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆, it holds by the same token that 〈𝒬𝒬〉, in the deterministic 
case, corresponds to an eigenvalue of 𝑄𝑄, but since [𝑅𝑅, 𝑆𝑆] ≠ 0, the eigenvalues of 𝑄𝑄 are not sums of 
eigenvalues of 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑆𝑆.  
But then how could we state that 𝒬𝒬 = ℛ + 𝒮𝒮? We cannot simultaneously measure ℛ and 𝒮𝒮, nor 
can we measure them successively and then add the outcomes obtained to get the value of 𝒬𝒬. Fur-
thermore, since we are assuming that B’ does not hold at the deterministic level for incompatible 
beables, we cannot invoke von Neumann’s rationale to go around the experimental incompatibility 
and functionally define 𝒬𝒬—i.e, to define 𝒬𝒬 as 𝐟𝐟(ℛ,𝒮𝒮)—in terms of dispersion-free expectation values 
of different sub-ensembles. That is, at the deterministic level the expectation value of 𝒬𝒬 is not a func-
tion of the expectation values of ℛ and 𝒮𝒮—i.e., 〈𝒬𝒬〉 ≠ 〈ℛ〉 + 〈𝒮𝒮〉. Thus, we conclude that the beable 𝒬𝒬 
is not the beable that is the linear combination ℛ + 𝒮𝒮, for 𝒬𝒬 cannot be functionally defined in terms 
of ℛ and 𝒮𝒮. That is, without B’, in a HVT in which 𝑅𝑅, 𝑆𝑆, and 𝑄𝑄, each represents a beable, 𝒬𝒬 is not a 
function 𝐟𝐟 of ℛ and 𝒮𝒮—in short, 𝒬𝒬 ≠ ℛ + 𝒮𝒮 despite that 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆. Consequently, the beable ℛ + 𝒮𝒮 
is not represented by the operator 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆, and it cannot even be defined functionally in terms of the 
mathematical representatives of ℛ and 𝒮𝒮. Thus, if B’ is dropped for dispersion-free states, so is II. 
We could still take the experimental procedure associated to the operator 𝑄𝑄, and define its out-
come as the value of the beable we name “ℛ + 𝒮𝒮”, but that does not mean that the defined beable is 
a function of ℛ and 𝒮𝒮, of course. Let us illustrate with the Hamiltonian operator 𝐻𝐻 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑄𝑄) + 𝑔𝑔(𝑃𝑃). 
We could stipulate in our putative HVT in Hilbert space that a usual 𝐻𝐻-measurement is a measure-
ment of beable ℰ. However, given the incompatibility of the beables 𝒬𝒬 and 𝒫𝒫, we cannot measure 
them jointly nor successively to obtain the value of ℰ. By assumption, B’ does not hold for the dis-
persion-free case, so we cannot use the additivity of expectation values to define ℰ in functional 
terms of 𝒬𝒬 and 𝒫𝒫 as 〈ℰ〉 = 𝑓𝑓〈𝒬𝒬〉 + 𝑔𝑔〈𝒫𝒫〉. That is, although we could take a certain measurement out-
come as the value of beable ℰ, call this beable “energy”, and represent it by 𝐻𝐻, we cannot consider ℰ 
as the beable that is the function 𝐟𝐟(𝒬𝒬,𝒫𝒫) = 𝑓𝑓(𝒬𝒬) + 𝑔𝑔(𝒫𝒫). Without B’, a HVT in Hilbert space simply 
does not have the resources to define the beable 𝐟𝐟(𝒬𝒬,𝒫𝒫)—the suitable operator 𝐻𝐻 is doing a different 
job. Furthermore, that additivity does hold at the dispersive level will not solve the problem—recall 
that the obstacle von Neumann identifies for the functional definition is experimental incompatibil-
ity, not the probabilities. Actually, in our putative HVT, additivity for dispersive states would be a 
feature loudly crying for an explanation, precisely because it does not hold at the level.12 
The upshot is that if we jettison B’ for the deterministic case and we stay within the boundaries of 
Hilbert space, we cannot define the beable ℛ + 𝒮𝒮 functionally in terms of ℛ and 𝒮𝒮 when ℛ and 𝒮𝒮 are 
experimentally incompatible. Thus, if B’ is violated at the dispersion-free level, so is II, so Bub’s 
12 Empirical adequacy enforces that the trace rule (1) holds in a putative deterministic HVT for dispersive states. 
Thus, there must be a story in such a theory to justify (1) and to explain dispersive additivity. In Bohm’s theory, 
that story is given by the dynamics of measurements and the role of Hermitian operators, which is not to represent 
beables (see section 5.2 below). 
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evaluation of the theorem is correct. I also agree with Dieks’ (2017, 141) appraisal (which is quite 
close to Jammer’s) that “von Neumann has proved that viable hidden-variables theories cannot be 
Hilbert space theories”. In other words, if we want to exploit the full representational power of Her-
mitian operators in Hilbert space with respect to beables, respecting the principle that the functional 
relations between quantities are mirrored by the representing operators, we certainly need B’. But 
then dispersion-free states are not possible. If we want them to be possible, we must reject B’ for 
dispersion-free states (as Bell rightly noted), but then II cannot hold either, so Hilbert space is not 
enough to represent the theory’s beables.13 
Summing up, Bell is correct in that in a putative HVT that observes B’ and II, the expectation 
values for operators which are a linear combination of non-commuting operators should be additive 
in the hypothetical dispersion-free case, which leads to a contradiction. But this conclusion runs 
short. The truly important point is that if von Neumann’s four assumptions hold, there are no dis-
persion-free states. Von Neumann does not arbitrarily impose B’ on deterministic states, he uses it 
as a principle that allows us to functionally define observables like ℛ + 𝑆𝑆 in Hilbert space, and then 
it turns out that deterministic states are not allowed by (1). Bell’s analysis was very important in 
clarifying that vNT is not a general impossibility proof, but his disdainful evaluation misses the 
highly significant result that Hilbert space HVTs are not possible.  
Anyhow, Bell’s criticism prompts a very interesting question: can the exact same result of vNT be 
obtained from weaker assumptions that do not entail the additivity of dispersion-free expectation 
values for non-commuting operators? 
 
 
4. VON NEUMANN AND GLEASON 
The answer to this question is affirmative. Andrew Gleason (1957) obtained the result that in a 
Hilbert space ℋ of dimension 3 and higher, every measure 𝜇𝜇 on a subspace 𝐴𝐴 of ℋ is given by (1), 
that is, 𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴) = Tr(𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴), where 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 is the projector onto 𝐴𝐴, and 𝑈𝑈 is a positive-definite, trace-one op-
erator. The crucial premises in GT are that 〈𝐼𝐼〉 = 1, and that for mutually orthogonal projectors such 
that ∑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼, it holds that 〈∑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉 = ∑〈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉.  
Between vNT and GT there is indeed a very close connection. Both theorems show that if all pos-
sible measurement outcomes are represented by projection operators acting in a Hilbert space ℋ, 
the algorithm to assign probability measures on those outcomes is given by the trace rule 𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴) =
Tr(𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴). Thus, the quantum states admitted by this algorithm are exclusively given by the density 
13 In a reply to Bub (2010) and Dieks (2017), Mermin & Schack (2018) defend the Hermann-Bell objection by claiming 
that even if B’ is rejected for incompatible quantities in the dispersion-free case, II still allows to define quantities 
like ℛ + 𝒮𝒮 when [𝑅𝑅, 𝑆𝑆] ≠ 0. In their own words, “assumption II provides a powerful alternative way to define linear 
combinations of physical quantities that are not jointly measurable. In terms of that definition it is not only mean-
ingful to reject B’ for the hypothetical dispersion-free subensembles, but quite compatible with the general structure of 
ordinary quantum mechanics” (Mermin & Schack 2018, 1013; my italics). After our analysis of vNT, we see that the 
emphasized statement in the quotation is wrong. It is true that, given the quantum states admitted by the trace rule (1), 
which are always dispersive, II is enough to define quantities like ℛ + 𝒮𝒮 by means of an operator 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆. However, since 
a theory that does admit dispersion-free states must reject B’ (even if only for the case of incompatible quantities and 
deterministic states), the theory cannot define a beable like ℛ + 𝒮𝒮 by the operator 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆. A deterministic HVT that 
rejects B’ must reject II as well, so it cannot represent its beables by means of Hermitian operators. Thus, a viable 
deterministic HVT must significantly depart from the general structure of ordinary quantum mechanics. 
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operators 𝑈𝑈 in ℋ, and expectation values of observables are given by 〈𝑅𝑅〉𝑈𝑈 = Tr(𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅), where 𝑅𝑅 is 
Hermitian. 
There are interesting differences, though. First, in GT, the result holds for 𝑛𝑛-dimensional Hilbert 
spaces with 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 3. The derived trace rule holds for 1- and 2-dimensional subspaces 𝐴𝐴, though, but 
as long as they are embedded in a 3-dimensional space.14 A more important difference is that GT 
makes use of sets of orthogonal projectors that add up to 𝐼𝐼 to represent possible measurement out-
comes. Since these projectors mutually commute, the derivation of the trace rule in this theorem 
assumes a condition weaker than von Neumann’s B’, namely, the additivity of expectation values 
of commuting operators 〈∑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉 = ∑〈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉. In other words, whereas both theorems prove that (1) deter-
mines the quantum states allowed and the expectation values (or measures), vNT proves it from A’, 
B’, I and II, whereas GT proves it from 〈𝐼𝐼〉 = 1 and 〈∑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉 = ∑〈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉. 
The close connection between the meaning and aim of vNT and GT is not only a matter of con-
ceptual analysis, there is also historical evidence for it. In a paper published five years before his 
seminal book, von Neumann (1927a) had already presented the essentials of the axiomatized formu-
lation of quantum theory in the framework of Hilbert space. In a subsequent paper entitled Wahr-
scheinlichkeitstheoretischer Aufbau der Quantenmechanik (1927b), he complained that in his previous 
article he had uncritically assumed the Born rule and formulated its counterpart in Hilbert space: 
the trace rule (1). Von Neumann thought that given its relevance, (1) should be adopted in the the-
ory not only on the basis of empirical adequacy—as it was in his first 1927 paper—but it should also 
be derived from basic formal principles in Hilbert space (see Duncan & Janssen 2013, 246). 
 Von Neumann (1927b) accomplished that goal in the Aufbau paper, and the derivation of the trace 
rule he presented there is simply the first step in our review of vNT in the 1932 book (see Duncan & 
Janssen 2013, 247-250). In the Aufbau paper, von Neumann also proved the corollary that if the den-
sity operator 𝑈𝑈 is homogeneous, it is a projector onto a unit vector. However, in 1927 he did not 
connect the derivation of (1), nor this corollary, with the possibility of an ignorance interpretation 
of the probabilities. In a word, the second paper of 1927 presents (the early version of) vNT only as 
a proof that from basic principles in Hilbert space the trace rule follows, regardless of issues about 
hidden variables. This is interesting because, seen in this way, vNT is obviously quite analogous to 
GT. But then in this reading we would hardly object against B’ along the lines of Hermann and Bell, 
especially if we consider von Neumann’s rationale for it as a principle that allows to functionally 
define quantities like 𝐟𝐟(ℛ,𝒮𝒮) when ℛ and 𝒮𝒮 are experimentally incompatible.  
Now, if we further ask about the possibility of deterministic states and an ignorance interpretation 
of (1) for the quantum Hilbert space formalism, the second stage of vNT presented in 1932 answers 
both questions in the negative. It is then an unfortunate historical fact that vNT was misconceived 
as a general impossibility  proof (correct or incorrect) of HVTs, rather than properly understood as 
a derivation of the trace rule from basic principles in Hilbert space, from which a no-go result for 
HVTs in Hilbert space follows as a corollary. 
That vNT is not only a result about HVTs, but also a proof that quantum mechanical states in 
Hilbert space are always given by density operators, just like GT, has been rarely noticed in the 
14 Using positive operator valued measures (POVMs) instead of projectors, Paul Busch (2003) derived a proof of GT 
that holds also for 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Busch’s is a valuable result, for it allows us to generalize everything 
we will say about Hermitian operators, on the basis of GT, to POVMs as well. 
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philosophy and foundations literature.15 Another important connection between the theorems, that, 
as far as I know, has not been noticed at all, is that exactly the same restriction that vNT (rightly 
interpreted) imposes on HVTs can be straightforwardly derived from GT. 
Recall our analysis of vNT in two steps. First a derivation of (1) from A’, B’, I and II, and then a 
proof that 〈ℛ〉𝑈𝑈 = Tr(𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅) does not admit dispersion-free states whereas it does admit dispersive ho-
mogeneous states, in which A’, B’, I and II are not used—only the definitions of dispersion-free 
states, homogeneous states, and some mathematical properties of Hilbert space are needed. Thus, it 
is easy to see that we can run the second step in vNT, from Gleason’s derivation of (1), but this time 
the second step is not conditional on B’, but on the weaker premise 〈∑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉 = ∑〈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉, so the Hermann-
Bell objection does not apply. Now, a most important issue here is that if we take the weaker premise 
〈∑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉 = ∑〈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉 as assuming that the projectors (and Hermitian operators in general) represent beables, then 
dispersion-free states do not exist and there are homogeneous states. That is, GT also shows the 
impossibility of embedding the quantum formalism in a HVT in Hilbert space. 
If we consider Bub’s reassessment of vNT, we have that GT establishes the very same result for 
HVTs. That is, if Hermitian operators represent physical properties of a system, and projectors rep-
resent yes-no propositions about values for those properties (according, most naturally, to 〈∑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉 =
∑〈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉), we obtain the trace rule (1), which we know does not admit dispersion-free states, but does 
admit  homogeneous ones. In short, just like vNT, GT shows the unviability of HVTs that admit 
dispersion-free states and represent their beables in terms of Hermitian operators. According to both 
vNT and GT, if in a putative HVT Hermitian operators are upgraded from their role of conveying 
probability measures of measurement outcomes to representatives of properties, then dispersion-
free states cannot be defined. Thus, viable HVTs need to go beyond Hilbert space and represent their 
beables in some other way. 
After this analysis one might be tempted to state that Gleason proved the same result as von Neu-
mann, but without invoking the problematic, or at least too strong, assumption B’. However, after 
our analysis of the justification for B’, I think a more accurate evaluation is the following. Von Neu-
mann established the trace rule (1) by starting out from the condition that the full representative 
power of observables in Hilbert space is guaranteed by B’. It then turned out that HVTs in Hilbert 
space are not possible. Gleason did not assume this condition from the outset, but since his theorem 
also leads to the result that HVTs are not possible, B’, which follows from the linearity of (1), holds 
for all allowed states (they are all dispersive). Then, the representative power of Hermitian operators 
in Hilbert space is guaranteed as a result in GT. In this sense, the theorems complement each other, 
and we see that B’ is not an unjustified assumption introduced by von Neumann. The proper lesson 
from critiques like Bell’s and Hermann’s is that B’ restricts the scope of vNT to Hilbert space, but it 
is precisely this restriction that makes the theorem so important for HVTs. 
 
 
5. KOCHEN & SPECKER MEET VON NEUMANN AND GLEASON 
As we saw, in the KST, FUNC is imposed only on beables that are represented by operators that 
are the sum or the product of commuting operators, whereas in vNT, B’ holds also for operators that 
15 To my knowledge, only Jammer (1974, 297), Giuntini & Laudisa (2001), Busch (2003), and Bub (2010) have noticed 
the connection (but under different evaluations). 
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are a linear combination of non-commuting operators. This difference, in the light of Bell’s criticism, 
has led to a widespread opinion that the KST is much more relevant than vNT for HVTs (cf. Held 
2018). We also saw that it is a common belief that the relevance of the KST is that it imposes some 
form of contextuality on the ontology of beables of quantum systems in HVTs. 
We can now see that both these judgments are misconceptions. After Jammer’s and Bub’s clarifi-
cation of vNT, and given our examination of GT as proving the same result on the basis of weaker 
premises, we can clearly see that the KST has a rather weak import on HVTs, and that it does not 
really impose any form of contextuality on the beables in such theories. As we will now show, a HVT 
that avoids vNT and GT, avoids the KST as well, but not conversely. Besides, since in HVTs that 
avoid vNT and GT beables are not represented by Hermitian operators, the KST has no relevance 
for the ontology of beables in such theories.16 
 
5.1. CONSTRAINING STRENGTH 
Let us briefly recall Redhead’s analysis of the KST. It starts out from a characterization of a HVT 
in Hilbert space in terms of i) quantum systems always have definite values for all beables inde-
pendently of measurements; ii) every Hermitian operator represents a beable; and iii) every beable 
is represented by one Hermitian operator. A HVT in which i), ii) and iii) all hold is compelled to a 
FUNC-constrained complete and consistent assignment of beable values. The KST shows that such 
an assignment is impossible, so it forces HVTs to drop one of the assumptions i), ii), and iii).  
By dropping i) we get contextuality of the form a): for some beables, a system has definite values 
only relative to measurement contexts. By dropping ii), we get contextuality of type b): even though 
𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵 and 𝐶𝐶 all represent beables and 𝐶𝐶 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴) = 𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵), 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴) represents a beable, but 𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵) does not, 
so whether 𝐶𝐶 represents a beable or not depends on the measurement context. By dropping iii) we 
are led to contextuality of the form c): 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴) and 𝑔𝑔(𝐵𝐵) represent different beables, so which beable 𝐶𝐶 
represents depends on the measurement context. All these strategies concern the ontology of the 
beables in the putative HVT.  
On the other hand, Bub and Jammer have clarified that the true significance of vNT is that it rules 
out HVTs in which beables are represented by Hermitian operators, or more generally, that HVTs 
cannot be Hilbert space theories. Furthermore, we have shown that GT proves the same result on 
stronger grounds. Let us then consider what comes of the three forms of contextuality identified by 
Redhead (1987), in the light of vNT and GT. 
Both in b) and c), although not bijectively, the putative theory represents all its beables in terms 
of Hermitian operators, so expectation values are always given by the trace rule (1). In other words, 
HVTs that are contextual as in b) and c) are certainly Hilbert space theories. Thus, after the reviewed 
reassessment of the relevance of vNT and GT for HVTs, we get that such theories fall prey to vNT 
and GT. In short, HVTs characterized by [i) ∧ ¬ii) ∧ iii)] (contextuality b)), or by [i) ∧ ii) ∧ ¬iii)] (con-
textuality c)), are unviable by vNT and GT.  
In theories that take the a) avenue, both ii) and iii) hold. Thus, a HVT of the type a) is obviously a 
Hilbert space theory in which Hermitian operators bijectively represent its beables, and (1) conveys 
16 My deflationary interpretation of the KST is circumscribed to the ontology of HVTs. I do not mean that the theo-
rem is not important in other contexts (quantum information and quantum logic, for example). 
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the expectation values. We get then the same result. Ontologically contextual HVTs that go around 
the KST by strategy a), i.e., in which [¬i) ∧ ii) ∧ iii)], are also unviable by vNT and GT. 
It turns out then that the type of theories on which the KST imposes a contextual ontology of its 
beables are all Hilbert space theories, so their beables are always represented by Hermitian opera-
tors. Thus, the HVTs that are doomed to be ontologically contextual according to the standard read-
ing of the KST are rather uninteresting: they belong to the class of theories that is already ruled out 
by vNT and GT.  
On the other hand, in a HVT that avoids both vNT and GT, the beables are not represented by 
Hermitian operators. Hence, neither ii) nor iii) can hold in such a theory, and the KST no-go result 
is sidestepped. The upshot for our discussion is thus that a HVT that avoids vNT and GT, avoids the 
KST as well, but not conversely.17 The upshot is then that the comparative evaluation, after Bell’s 
analysis, that the KST is more relevant than vNT is upside down. Since a viable HVT is to observe 
the constraints imposed by all three theorems, the restriction imposed by vNT and GT is actually 
stronger and more fundamental than the one imposed by the KST. 
 
5.2. CONTEXTUALITY DEFLATED 
Given this diagnosis, we may now ask what is the precise conceptual import of the KST for HVTs. 
In Redhead’s (1987) analysis, a HVT in Hilbert space can only retain i) on the price of installing con-
textuality for its beables in the form of b) or c). But as we just saw, Hilbert space HVTs are ruled out 
by vNT and GT anyway. Let us then consider a HVT that does avoid both vNT and GT. In such a 
theory, neither ii) nor iii) holds, so, in principle, it can retain i) without making any contextuality 
concessions regarding the ontology of its beables. The spirit of HVTs expressed by i) is not threat-
ened in any sense by the KST when we consider the lesson to be learned from vNT and GT.  
Let us elaborate. We saw in section 2.2 that we can take the KST in strictly mathematical terms. 
The impossibility of assigning completely and consistently the number 1 to one ray in each orthog-
onal triad and the number 0 to the remaining rays still holds, of course. Now, in a viable HVT the 
trace rule (1) must hold as a matter of empirical adequacy, so some operational role must be as-
signed to Hermitian operators in the theory. That is, Hermitian operators will certainly work as ob-
servables in that theory, in the sense of representing numerical outcomes of experiments, but not pos-
sessed beable values. 
Now, that a FUNC-constrained complete and consistent assignment of (eigen)values for observables 
is not possible does not mean that there must be some type of contextuality affecting the beables in the 
putative HVT. If Hermitian operators are deprived of the role of representing beables, the KST im-
poses a contextuality constraint that is only phenomenological on such theories. That is, in viable 
HVTs, what is impossible by the KST is simply a FUNC-constrained complete and consistent assign-
ment of numerical outcomes of experiments given by eigenvalues of Hermitian operators, so the weak 
counterfactual reading I presented in section 2.2 above captures the right import of the KST for 
17 As a matter of logic, one could still conceive a deterministic HVT in which i) holds, in which Hermitian operators 
do not represent beables (so that ii) and iii) do not hold), but in which other tenets still lead to a FUNC-constrained 
complete and consistent assignment of eigenvalues to projectors (as we will see below, empirical adequacy requires 
that Hermitian operators must still represent experimental outcomes). However, it is hard to conceive a plausible 
physical motivation for such a convoluted HVT. Interestingly, in section 6 we will see that this highly implausible 
HVT does not necessarily fall prey to the KST. 
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HVTs. That is, in viable HVTs, given a projector-observable 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑓𝑓𝑄𝑄 = 𝑔𝑔𝑄𝑄′, such that [𝑄𝑄,𝑄𝑄′] ≠ 0, if in 
a 𝑃𝑃-experiment via a 𝑄𝑄-experiment we get the (eigen)value 1, in a 𝑃𝑃-experiment via a 𝑄𝑄′-experiment 
we would have obtained an (eigen)value 0. But in both cases, the obtained (eigen)values are only 
numerical results of experiments, not beable values.   
Thus, if we consider vNT and GT, the KST constraint affects only the phenomenology of HVTs, not 
their ontology. In simple words, for HVTs that observe vNT and GT constraints, the KST enforces 
that numerical outcomes of experiments must depend on the measurement context, but that does 
not mean that there must be something contextual at the level of beables ontology. If we still decide 
to use the term “contextuality” to characterize this formulation of the meaning of the KST, it cannot 
have the ontological import that is usually associated with it. If Hermitian operators have an opera-
tional role other than representing beables (as it is enforced by vNT and GT), and we consider that 
𝑄𝑄- and 𝑄𝑄′-measurements require different experimental setups and involve different physical inter-
actions between system and experimental device, there is nothing strange or peculiarly quantum 
about the phenomenological contextuality that the KST imposes. Actually, given the role that Her-
mitian operators play as representatives of numerical outcomes in experiments, this form of contex-
tuality is quite natural and expected. 
Actually, there is an extant example of all of this: Bohm’s theory. In Bohmian mechanics, systems 
are described by (𝜓𝜓,𝑄𝑄), where 𝜓𝜓 = 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 ℏ⁄  is the wavefunction, and 𝑄𝑄 is the configuration of the par-
ticles, given by the positions 𝐱𝐱 of all the particles in the system. Momentum is given by 𝐩𝐩 = ∇𝑆𝑆(𝐱𝐱) 𝑚𝑚⁄ . 
The fundamental beable is of course 𝐱𝐱, and other properties are given by functions of positions and 




𝑉𝑉, where 𝑊𝑊 and 𝑉𝑉 are the quantum and the classical potentials, respectively. Since we only have 
access to the statistical distribution of the particles, given by 𝑅𝑅2 = |𝜓𝜓|2, predictions are probabilistic, 
and they are numerically equal to the expectation values given by Hermitian operators and the trace 
rule (1). In our example of energy, it holds that 
 
〈𝐸𝐸〉𝜓𝜓 = �𝑅𝑅2 �
(∇𝑆𝑆)2
2𝑚𝑚
+ 𝑊𝑊 + 𝑉𝑉� d3x = �𝜓𝜓∗ �−�
ℏ2
2𝑚𝑚
�∇2 + 𝑉𝑉�𝜓𝜓 d3𝑥𝑥 = 〈𝐻𝐻〉𝜓𝜓 
 
In the literature on Bohmian mechanics it has been clear for a while that Hermitian operators are 
not representatives of beables. Rather, they are “book-keeping devices for […] wavefunction statis-
tics” (Dürr & Teufel 2009, 228). In a word, in Bohm’s theory Hermitian operators map the composite 
of measured system plus experimental apparatus, after they have interacted, to probabilistically distributed 
numerical (eigen)values—see (Daumer et al. 1997) and (Dürr, Goldstein & Zanghì 2004). Then, if an 
operator 𝑂𝑂 is a function of two non-commuting operators, associated to two incompatible experi-
mental procedures, that the obtained eigenvalue for an 𝑂𝑂-measurement depends on the experi-
mental context is quite natural, and has nothing to do with some bizarre ontological contextuality of 
beables—the interactions in the experimental procedures are different, that is all. An important point 
for us is that the analysis of the role of Hermitian operators presented in (Daumer et al. 1997) and 
(Dürr, Goldstein & Zanghì 2004) is quite general. That is, it does not refer to peculiar features of 
Bohm’s theory, so the same is expected in any viable HVT that assumes principle i). 
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A concrete illustration of how contextuality works in Bohmian mechanics is presented in Bub 
(1997, 165-169) (cf. Pagonis & Clifton 1995). The squared-spin operator in the 𝑧𝑧-direction 𝑆𝑆𝑧𝑧2 is a func-
tion of two non-commuting operators 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐻𝐻′, that is, 𝑆𝑆𝑧𝑧2 = 𝐻𝐻2 = 𝐻𝐻′2, where 𝐻𝐻 = 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥2 − 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦2 and 𝐻𝐻′ =
𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥′2 − 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦′2  (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧 and 𝑥𝑥′, 𝑦𝑦’, 𝑧𝑧 are two different triads of orthogonal directions). Since an 𝐻𝐻-experi-
ment and an 𝐻𝐻′-experiment are incompatible, that the 𝑆𝑆𝑧𝑧2-value obtained depends on whether an 𝐻𝐻- 
or an 𝐻𝐻′-experiment is performed is totally natural if we keep in mind that Hermitian operators map 
the composite of measured systems plus experimental apparatus, after they have interacted, to prob-
abilistically distributed numerical (eigen)values.18 
As it is clear, this form of contextuality, which is an instance of the weaker physical reading of the 
relevance of the KST, has nothing to do with the ontology of the beables of systems in a HVT like 
Bohmian mechanics. At an ontological level, position and the rest of Bohmian beables are not con-
textual: this theory is not contextual in the form of a), b) or c). As Clifton & Pagonis conclude, Bohm-
ian contextuality is “hardly the sort of contextualism to write home about” (1995, 290). After our 
examination of the constraints on HVTs imposed by vNT and GT, and our reassessment of the rele-
vance of the KST for hidden variable theories in the light of such constraints, we can see that this is 
not a contingent quality of Bohmian mechanics, but an expected feature in any viable HVT.19 
 
5.3. BELL AND GLEASON 
In the same article in which Bell (1966) presented his criticism of vNT, he derived a result equiv-
alent to the KST as a corollary to GT. A simple reconstruction of Bell’s reasoning is the following. 
We can take 𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴) = Tr(𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴) as a map 𝜇𝜇′ from each point in the surface of the unit sphere in a 3-
dimensional Hilbert space onto [1,0]. According to 𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴) = Tr(𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴), the map 𝜇𝜇′ is continuous, in the 
sense that sufficiently small changes in positions on the sphere produce small changes in the corre-
sponding probabilities.20 If we assume a HVT characterized by i), ii), and iii), in a FUNC-constrained 
complete and consistent assignment of values to pairs of antipodal points in the sphere (determined 
by projectors), the points in each pair should be assigned a 1 or a 0, and both values must occur. 
Thus, it must hold that for two arbitrarily close points, one gets the value 1, and the other the value 
0. But since 𝜇𝜇′ is continuous, the FUNC-constrained and complete assignment leads to a contradic-
tion. 
Bell was quick to realize that this is not an absolute proof of the impossibility of HVTs: it does rule 
out theories that impose a FUNC-constrained complete and consistent assignment of 1s and 0s to 
all the projectors onto the rays that determine antipodal points in the surface of the unit sphere, but 
contextual assignments are still possible. Besides, he was explicit in that this result is not puzzling if 
we consider that the impossible assignment requires that a projector-measurement must yield the 
same result independently of what other experiments are made simultaneously: 
18 Bohm himself was aware of the role that Hermitian operators play in his theory: “the measurement of an “observ-
able” is not really a measurement of any physical property belonging to the observed system alone. Instead, the 
value of an “observable” measures only an incompletely predictable and controllable potentiality belonging just as 
much to the measuring apparatus as to the observed system itself” (Bohm 1952, 183).  
19 That in deterministic HVTs the beables cannot be represented by Hermitian operators implies that Bohmian me-
chanics is not an interpretation of quantum mechanics but a rival theory, see Acuña (2019). 
20 Notice that the continuity of the map 𝜇𝜇′ also holds in von Neumann’s derivation of the trace rule (1), which in 
turn means that Bell’s corollary to GT can also be derived from vNT. 
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The danger in fact was not in the explicit but in the implicit assumptions. It was tacitly assumed that 
measurement of an observable must yield the same value independently of what other measurements 
may be made simultaneously. Thus as well as 𝑃𝑃(Φ3) say, one might measure either 𝑃𝑃(Φ2) or 𝑃𝑃(Ψ2) , 
where Φ2 and Ψ2 are orthogonal to Φ3 but not to one another. These different possibilities require dif-
ferent experimental arrangements; there is no a priori reason to believe that the results for 𝑃𝑃(Φ3) should 
be the same. The result of an observation may reasonably depend not only on the state of the system 




In this passage, the evaluation of the relevance of the KST that Bell defends as reasonable comes 
close to the one that we are proposing here. Now, another way to make our point is that this inter-
pretation, which Bell characterizes as plausible, is actually enforced when we consider the stronger 
constraint imposed on HVTs by vNT and GT. Unfortunately, Bell’s criticism of vNT precluded him 
to see that. Once again, in HVTs operators must have the operational role of being representatives 
of numerical outcomes of experiments, but they cannot be representatives of beables—Bell did not 
notice that this is not only reasonable, but commanded by vNT (and GT). Then, in the light of this 
command, the KST forces HVTs to yield numerical outcomes of experiments in a context-dependent 
way, but this is hardly surprising, and there is nothing peculiarly quantum about it. 
In other words, Bell’s own contextuality result offers us one more way to illustrate our point. The 
reader may have noticed the similarity between Bell’s contextuality proof and von Neumann’s 
demonstration that the trace rule does not allow dispersion-free states (see section 3.1 above), but in 
close inspection they are very different. Von Neumann (and Gleason) proved that if we assume that 
beables are represented by Hermitian operators, states can only be given by the density operators 𝑈𝑈 
in the trace rule (1). In turn, (1) determines that the map 𝜇𝜇′ from measures to the points on the sur-
face of the unit sphere must be continuous, which means that, for hypothetical dispersion-free states, 
all the points along a continuous path between two points should be assigned with the same number: 
either 1 or 0. But then it should be the case that 𝑈𝑈 = 𝐼𝐼 or 𝑈𝑈 = 0, but this is impossible since Tr𝑈𝑈 = 1. 
On the other hand, Bell uses the same continuity enforced by (1) to show that a non-contextual dis-
tribution of 1s and 0s for the points on the surface of the unit sphere is impossible. Hence, since 
dispersion-free states must assign either 1s or 0s to the points on the surface, it follows that if there 
are such states, the assignment they induce must be contextual. But since by vNT and GT the possi-
bility of such states requires that there cannot be a representative link between Hermitian operators 
and beables, the contextuality in Bell’s corollary (and in the KST) does not affect the beables.21 
6. THE MEYER-KENT-CLIFTON ARGUMENT 
21 After these remarks we can see GT in all its remarkable strength. First, it shows that if measurement outcomes are 
given by projectors, measures over those outcomes are always given by the trace rule (1). Second, a “von Neumann 
corollary” follows that deterministic HVTs in Hilbert space are ruled out. Thirdly, a “KS-Bell corollary” follows that 
a non-contextual assignment of eigenvalues to projectors is not possible. After what we said in section 4, we get the 
interesting result that vNT is equally strong: both corollaries can also be obtained from von Neumann’s derivation of 
(1). As we saw, the difference lies on the premises: 〈𝐼𝐼〉 = 1 and 〈∑𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉 = ∑〈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖〉 in GT; A’, B’, I and II in vNT. 
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The analysis presented allows us to differentiate my proposal from an interesting argument that 
is apparently similar in spirit—it claims to have “nullified” the significance of the KST—and to 
reevaluate the significance of that argument in new light. 
Recall that the KST, in the Kochen-Specker (1967) formulation, proceeds by identifying a set of 
rays in ℋ3 for which a complete and consistent FUNC-constrained assignment is impossible. Fol-
lowing the jargon in the literature, let us call such a set a KS-uncolorable set.22 On the other hand, 
we saw that in Bell’s (1966) proof the impossibility of the KS-coloring is derived from the continuity 
of the mapping 𝜇𝜇′. David Meyer (1999) proved that if in order to determine the set of rays (that 
correspond to the projectors of a physical system) to be KS-colored in a 3-dimensional Hilbert space 
we use rational coordinates, instead of real (or complex) coordinates, KS-colorings are possible. 
Adrian Kent (1999) extended this result to Hilbert spaces ℋ𝑛𝑛 of any dimensions.  
The sense in which these results nullify the KST, in the Kochen-Specker (1967) formulation, is that 
for any KS-uncolorable set of rays, there is a KS-colorable set in which the rays are arbitrarily close 
to the rays in the former set. The nullification of Bell’s (1967) proof consists in that the KS-colorable 
set is dense, but the corresponding mapping 𝜈𝜈 from each point in the unit sphere (determined by 
rational-coordinates rays) to 1 or 0 is not continuous. The physical motivation for such a construc-
tion, Meyer (1999) states, is that measurements are always of finite precision. 
Rob Clifton & Adrian Kent (2000) (see also Barrett & Kent 2004) have shown that it is possible to 
construct a HVT, empirically indistinguishable from ordinary quantum theory, that yields a KS-
colored dense set of projectors 𝒫𝒫 for a physical system. Let 𝒞𝒞 be the set of all the decompositions of 
the identity operator 𝐼𝐼 in terms of orthogonal projectors in ℋ𝑛𝑛. Kent’s result implies that 𝒫𝒫 is dense 
in the set of all projectors in ℋ𝑛𝑛, and also that the set 𝒟𝒟 of all projective decompositions of 𝐼𝐼 given 
by the projectors in 𝒫𝒫 is dense in 𝒞𝒞. Now, let us assume that every measurement corresponds to a 
decomposition of the identity operator I in terms of orthogonal projectors. However, given finite 
precision, we can stipulate that not every projective decomposition of 𝐼𝐼 in 𝒞𝒞 corresponds to a possi-
ble measurement, but only the ones in 𝒟𝒟. Thus, in our putative HVT, “the result of any measurement 
is determined by hidden variables that assign a definite value to each operator in 𝒫𝒫 in a non-contex-
tual manner” (Barret & Kent 2004, 158).23 
Now, given a certain measurement, we may ask which of the elements in 𝒟𝒟 our HVT determines 
that the measurement corresponds to. Clifton & Kent (2000) introduce an algorithm to answer this 
question, which is further elaborated in Barret & Kent (2004): 
Consider some ordering {𝑑𝑑1,𝑑𝑑2, … } of the countable set 𝒟𝒟. Let 𝜀𝜀 be a parameter much smaller than the 
precision attainable in any current or foreseeable experiment. More precisely, 𝜀𝜀 is sufficiently small 
that it will be impossible to tell from the outcome statistics if a measurement attempts to measure a 
decomposition 𝑑𝑑 = {𝑃𝑃1, … ,𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛} and actually measures a decomposition 𝑑𝑑′ = {𝑃𝑃1′, … ,𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛′} provided |𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 −
22 It is usual to describe a complete and consistent FUNC-constrained assignment as an assignment of colors to the 
surface of the unit sphere in an 𝑛𝑛-dimensional Hilbert space such that for 𝑛𝑛 pairs of antipodal points determined by 
mutually orthogonal rays, one pair is assigned one color (e.g., green), and the rest with another color (e.g., red).  
23 As Held (2018, section 6) points out, if the HVT assigns a physically meaningful value (as possessed beable values) 
to the projectors that constitute KS-uncolorable sets, the theory would still be ontologically contextual. But if we cut 
such projectors from the ontology, then the resulting HVT would be rather bizarre. In the case of spin, for example, 
the theory would state that not every one of the continuous different directions in physical space determines a spin-
beable and a spin-measurement, or that there are not continuously many directions in physical space. For a critical 
assessment of the MKC argument based on the same issue, see Appleby (2005).  
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𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖′| < 𝜀𝜀 for all 𝑖𝑖. Suppose now we design a quantum experiment which would, if quantum theory were 
precisely correct, measure the projective decomposition 𝑑𝑑. […] We could imagine that the hidden var-
iable theory uses the following algorithm: first, it identifies the first decomposition 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = �𝑃𝑃1𝑖𝑖 , … ,𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖� in 
the sequence such that �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖� < 𝜀𝜀 for all 𝑗𝑗 from 1 to 𝑛𝑛. Then, it reports the outcome of the experiment 
as that defined by the hidden variables for 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖: in other words, it reports outcome 𝑗𝑗 if the hidden vari-




Let us now assess the MKC argument from the point of view of the KST in the light of vNT and 
GT. First notice that the algorithm obviously presupposes that the predictions in the HVT are given 
by the trace rule (1) (cf. Clifton & Kent 2000, 2106). Now, that the mapping 𝜈𝜈 (given by the algorithm 
on the basis of the trace rule) from the points in the unit sphere (determined by the projectors in the 
dense set 𝒫𝒫) to 1 or 0 is not a continuous function does not alter the fact that (1) does not admit 
dispersion-free states, but admits homogeneous ones. Although it is clear that Clifton & Kent (2000) 
and Barrett & Kent (2004) have HVTs in Hilbert space in mind (so that projectors represent beables), 
we now know that such theories are impossible. 
Then, what the MKC argument proves is that a there can be a HVT that assigns numerical 
(eigen)values to experimental outcomes in a complete and consistent FUNC-constrained (non-contex-
tual) manner, as long as the Hermitian operators that describe experimental outcomes are given by 
the dense sets 𝒫𝒫 and 𝒟𝒟. In other words, the argument shows that there can be HVTs, empirically 
indistinguishable from ordinary quantum mechanics, which, despite the KST, are not forced to be 
phenomenologically contextual in the sense described in section 5.2. However, we now know that, 
despite the KST, by vNT and GT there was no ontological contextuality to be nullified in the first 
place. That is, considering the restriction that vNT and GT impose on HVTs, the (phenomenological) 
non-contextuality that the MKC reinstates has no ontological import. Considering that phenomeno-
logical contextuality is quite natural and expected in HVTs that avoid vNT and GT, the upshot is 
that there is no ontological motivation for the non-contextual HVTs that the MKC argument shows 
to be possible.24 
 
7. CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
According to philosophy of physics folklore, the relevance of vNT is quite weak and uninteresting. 
After Bell’s and Hermann’s criticisms that made clear that the theorem is not an impossibility proof, 
it is a widespread belief that its only significance is that it rules out an uninteresting class of HVTs. 
24 Phenomenologically non-contextual theories that avoid vNT and GT would be highly implausible (cf. fn. 17). As 
we saw in section 5.2, phenomenological contextuality is an expected and natural feature in HVTs in which Hermit-
ian operators denote observables, but not beables, so there is no reasonable motivation for a HVT to be phenome-
nologically non-contextual. Furthermore, Appleby (2002) shows that the HVTs in the MKC argument have a very 
strange property. For entangled states, the choice of a determinate direction for a spin-measurement on Alice’s par-
ticles determines the directions that admit physically possible spin-measurements on Bob’s particles (cf. fn. 23)—
i.e., Alice’s measurement context determines the physically well-defined quantities in Bob’s lab. When we consider 
that in the phenomenologically non-contextual HVTs that the MKC argument shows possible Hermitian operators 
represent observables, but not beables, this feature becomes a bizarre form of non-locality that goes beyond the non-
locality enforced by Bell’s theorem. Anyhow, the MKC mathematical result that there exist dense KS-colorable sets 
in Hilbert spaces of any dimensionality is certainly interesting, and it might be significant for issues in quantum 
information and quantum logic (cf. fn. 16). 
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On the other hand, the standard reading of the KST is that it forces HVTs to make a huge concession 
in their basic spirit and motivation, for it allegedly shows that in such theories there will be some 
properties that are ontologically dependent on the measurement context. 
As we have seen, both these official stances are misconceptions. As Jammer, Bub and Dieks have 
convincingly argued, vNT shows that HVTs cannot be Hilbert space theories, or, more precisely, 
that a viable HVT cannot represent its beables by means of Hermitian operators. As I have shown, 
the very same result can be derived from Gleason’s unquestionable theorem, on the basis of weaker 
premises that are not subject to the criticism that Grete Hermann and John Bell levelled against vNT. 
On the other hand, a careful analysis shows that the interpretation that the KST imposes an onto-
logical contextuality constraint on the beables in HVTs crucially presupposes that such beables are 
represented by Hermitian operators, or, in other words, that the HVTs that are condemned to be 
ontologically contextual are Hilbert space theories. Thus, if we interpret the KST in the light of a 
correct reading of vNT, and also in the light of GT, it turns out that the HVTs in which beables are 
ontologically contextual are unviable. Furthermore, viable HVTs that avoid both vNT and GT also 
naturally avoid the ontological contextuality result of the KST. The upshot is that vNT and GT have 
a much more fundamental relevance for HVTs than the KST. 
The precise import that the mathematical result obtained by Kochen & Specker has for HVTs is 
that a FUNC-constrained complete and consistent assignment of (eigen)values to Hermitian opera-
tors-as-observables is not possible (unless we restrict our operators-as-observables to the dense sets 𝒫𝒫 
and 𝒟𝒟 in the MKC argument). That is, since by vNT and GT such operators cannot be representative 
of the theory’s beables, the contextuality at issue, if we still decide to use this term, does not affect 
their ontology. Given that Hermitian operators must still have an operational meaning in HVTs, the 
import of the KST is only phenomenological. This is actually a well-known feature in Bohm’s theory, 
so now we understand that it is not an accidental quality of Bohmian mechanics, but an expected 
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